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Lewis and Haarr: No Room for Mistakes: British and Allied Submarine Warfare 1939–1

The resiliency, dedication, and mental
toughness that the Chosen Few soldiers
displayed, even though medevac assets
and air support were lacking, are
commendable. At Wanat, they were
on their own in enemy territory and
outnumbered by enemy insurgents just
meters outside their fighting positions.
Yet they continued to fight, looking
out for one another in a way that only
those in close combat can understand.
In combat, soldiers fight for one another
more than anything else—they do not
want to let their buddies down.
The book raises the question: How
can the world’s most powerful military
put soldiers in harm’s way with only
limited resources and support? Lieutenant Colonel Bill Ostlund, battalion
commander of the 2/503 Infantry,
noted that the entire “brigade had
six Apache attack helicopters, and at
times as many as four were down for
maintenance. It was taking way too long
to get the wounded off the battlefield.”
Wanat was a travesty, not just another
bureaucratic oversight; the U.S. military
establishment clearly was surprised
and could not react quickly enough.
The July 2008 battle of Wanat itself was
horrific, and the fallout devastating for
all. Those who survived were tormented
by guilt, wondering what more they
could have done. The Army, for its
part, conducted several investigations,
released the findings, and then amended
the findings. Careers were ruined, and
some leaders left the Army. Even more
tragic, families lost faith in the chain
of command and the Army leadership,
because it seemed that no one was
held accountable for the circumstances
surrounding and the casualties resulting from the battle of Wanat.
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There are important lessons to be
learned from reading about these brave
soldiers of the Chosen Few. Zoroya
makes the following point: “Just as
military teachers for decades strolled
with students across the battlefields at
Gettysburg, Shiloh, and other famous
engagements to learn the art of war,
they [should] also virtually tour Wanat
in the years ahead.” These are lessons
that should not have to be relearned
each time U.S. forces engage in combat
operations, and that is why the battle of
Wanat will be studied by young men and
women at the U.S. Military Academy
and in college Reserve Officers’ Training
Corps (i.e., ROTC) detachments across
the United States for years to come.
Zoroya has done a masterful job of
highlighting the brave soldiers of the
Chosen Few. This book is a must-read
for military leaders at any level.
THOMAS J. GIBBONS

No Room for Mistakes: British and Allied Submarine Warfare 1939–1940, by Geirr H. Haarr.
Barnsley, U.K.: Seaforth, 2015. 450 pages. $49.95.

No Room for Mistakes is a meticulously
researched and well-written history of
the British and Allied submarine services from 1939 to 1940. The relatively
short time span the book covers allows
the author, Geirr Haarr, to delve into
granular detail, often giving weekby-week, even day-by-day, accounts
of particular submarines and their
travails fighting the German navy in the
eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean.
The book’s first chapter follows the
tragic story of HMS Thetis during the
first half of 1939. Shortly after it left
the Cammell Laird shipyards near
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Liverpool, England, a series of mistakes
coupled with some very bad luck left
the ship lying on the floor of the Irish
Sea. Only a few survivors made it to
the surface to be rescued. Eventually,
Thetis was salvaged, repaired, and sent
back into service. At first, this particular
story might seem out of place; after
all, the German military was nowhere
near Thetis when it sank. Yet after a few
chapters it is clear that Thetis’s story
artfully sets the tone for the entire book.
In 1939, there really was no room for
mistakes. Everything about submarine
warfare in the early years of World
War II was experimental, and the
margin for human error was paper-thin.
Hull designs, weapon systems, and
navigational equipment had undergone
evolutionary leaps since the early
U-boats of World War I—and crews had
to learn how to operate them on the fly.
Although crews learned quickly and
often achieved remarkable results, the
cost of not learning quickly enough, as
with Thetis, was high. Questions such as
the optimal depth and spread for firing
torpedoes, equipment configurations,
and maneuvering tactics remained
unresolved throughout this period.
Even bigger unknowns surrounded
operational employment. Some in
the British Admiralty argued that
submarines should be used primarily for surveillance; others argued for
minelaying or direct engagement of
surface vessels. After some early success
seemed to settle the debate in favor of
surface engagements, the German navy
became increasingly adept at thwarting
submarine attacks through the use
of convoys and air cover. Increasing
British losses from these improved
German tactics restarted the debate
on how submarines should be used.
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Difficulties for the submarine service
multiplied after the successful German
invasions of Norway and France in
1940. British submarines now found
themselves under threat of air attack
from the moment they left home, and
there were few neutral or allied ports
outside the home islands where a captain
could seek refuge if his boat suffered
battle damage. As the summer of 1940
advanced and nights became shorter, it
was also increasingly difficult for boats
to charge their batteries on the surface
without being detected and driven
underwater. These circumstances frayed
the nerves of even the most experienced
sailors—a point Haarr drives home with
his excellent narration and extensive use
of ships’ deck logs and crew diaries.
No Room for Mistakes is appropriate
for both junior and senior personnel
in the military as well as enthusiasts of
military history. Although submariners
will have the easiest time relating to
the material, individuals from every
branch and service will be inspired by
the bravery of British submarine sailors.
Additionally, the level of detail in No
Room for Mistakes makes it an invaluable resource for anyone researching a
particular aspect of military operations
or naval tactical developments during
the early World War II period.
My favorite aspect of No Room for Mistakes is Haarr’s extensive use of primary
sources, including diaries, logs, journals,
and photographs. These materials help
make the historical account of this
period much more poignant and remind
the reader of the high human cost of
war at sea. No Room for Mistakes is an
excellent addition to a personal library
and is recommended particularly to
anyone with an interest in naval history.
CHARLES T. LEWIS
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